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Abstract
The issue of objectivity of any knowledge claim remains 
heavily controversial in academic circles. Science and its 
practitioners claim to be objective, value free and able to 
attain definite or certain knowledge as opposed to mere 
opinion/belief whereas such pretensions are contended by 
the postmodern disposition that insists on the impossibility 
of definite/certain knowledge and objectivity. Postmodern 
thinking favours multiculturalism, relativism and a 
worldview in which claims of truth are contested. How 
does science respond to these critical matters and what are 
the prospects of science in the future in the face of these 
hurdles? What are some of the presuppositions of science 
that tend to obliterate its claim to certain and objective 
knowledge? How defensible and justifiable are some of 
the challenges that post modern thinking bring forth to be 
confronted by any epistemological endeavour that must be 
taken seriously as far the issue of objectivity and certainty 
are concerned? These are among the queries the paper 
seeks to answer in view of assessing the extent to which 
the tenuous tension can be appreciated and resolved. The 
exercise hopes to achieve this using the analytical and 
critical tools of philosophy.
Key words: Science; Objectivity; Modernism and 
Postmodernism
Anthony Idoko Okpanachi (2012). Science and the Postmodern 
Challenge. Studies in Sociology of Science, 3(4), 67-74. Available 
f rom h t tp : / /www.cscanada .ne t / index .php/sss /a r t i c le /v iew/
j.sss.1923018420120304.1152 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/
j.sss.1923018420120304.1152
INTRODUCTION
The successes of science and its applied version, 
technology are palpable and evident in the lives of 
humans today; from medicine and health, agriculture, 
transportation, communication to engineering. Such 
phenomenal feats are manifestly significant in this era 
that Harold observes “scientists have done their work so 
thoroughly and accurately, that today there is a strong 
presumption in favour of any idea that is set forth in the 
name of science. Humans have almost come to believe 
that science can explain everything and do nearly 
everything” (Harold, 1979, p. 90). This image of science 
comes under series of skeptical and ferocious attacks by 
post modern thinking as regards the claims of science 
with respect to objective and certain truth. Thus, scientists 
and science critics are engaged in some sorts of contest as 
regards the place and influences of social beliefs, interests 
and values in the development of knowledge in science 
especially with claims and counter claims of objective 
truths or subjective constructions. How these issues are 
justified and can be best assessed comes into focus in 
this paper. In doing this, the paper seeks to answer the 
question of the extent to which science can lay claim 
to certain and objective knowledge and the future of 
scientific knowledge in face of such challenges posed by 
post modern thinking. First, I shall begin by clarifying 
operational terms in this discourse. 
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 
Science
Science was defined by George Sarton as the acquisition 
and systematization of positive knowledge. By “positive”, 
Sarton meant information derived empirically from the 
evidence of the senses. This definition has the virtue of 
being succinct, but does not explain the methodological 
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procedures employed in science, how these methods differ 
from other systems of knowledge, the historical process 
by which these methods came to be adopted, or why other 
methods were ultimately rejected (Fuller, 2006, p. 6). 
The term ‘science’ etymologically is of Latin root, from 
the term “scientia” to know in the verb form or meaning 
knowledge in its noun form. Oraegbunam (2010, p. 58) 
attests to this thus; “science means a body of knowledge 
which proceeds from observation, experimentation, 
testing of hypothesis and culminating in scientific 
theories. This idea of science is the strict designation since 
broadly speaking; science (scientia) means knowledge 
whether artistic, scientific or otherwise”. No wonder then 
the Oxford English Dictionary defines science as the state 
or fact of knowing. Its meaning today has significantly 
shifted from its root as its usage evokes such a limited 
idea to refer to the activities of specialists in the social 
disciplines of psychology, sociology, anthropology but 
especially the physical disciplines of biology, chemistry, 
physics, geology, and astronomy, etc.. No wonder then, 
Izu notes that the word ‘scientists’ has become associated 
with laboratories, test tubes, microscopes, telescopes, and 
the like contraptions (Izu, 2009, p. 302). Aigbodioh (1997, 
p. 3) outlines the four basic characteristics of science as; 
specific, public, impersonal and objective. Science as 
used in this paper means western natural science and it is 
seen as a method designed to discover knowledge that is 
considered by some criteria to be reliable. The principle of 
verification was the anchor upon which the rise of modern 
science which gave birth to positivism as the foundation 
of empirical knowledge claims. This verification principle 
gave pride to the positivists and this pride made Karl 
Popper devised a criterion for demarcating science from 
pseudo-science through his thesis of falsification.
Postmodernism
Post modernism though very difficult to define; it 
literally means “after modernism”. It refers to an eclectic 
movement, originating in aesthetics, architecture 
and philosophy according to Ryan Bishop (1996), in 
Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology espousing 
a systematic skepticism of grounded theoretical 
perspectives. It is not a set of doctrines or truth claims but 
a completely new way of looking and approaching the 
world of ideas. Though a fluidy and elusive term, it brings 
a seemingly cohesive new approach to literature, history, 
architecture, education, law, sociology, philosophy, 
linguistics and virtually every discipline, including the 
physical sciences. The post modern challenge also affects 
popular culture through cinema, education, internet, TV 
and other media. In other words, post modern thinking is 
pervasive, affecting every area of life. Moreover, whose 
effects are becoming ever more encompassing since the 
post modern revolution is still happening. Its emergence 
in philosophical parlance is traceable to Jean Francois 
Lyotard’s publication of The Post Modern Condition, 
though its development owes a lot to the works of 
earlier philosophers. With Lyotard’s classical distinction 
between narrative knowledge and scientific knowledge, 
his claim that narrative knowledge can give to scientific 
knowledge a legitimacy that is now lost to the latter’s 
claim of providing a grand meta-narrative. According to 
Dadachanji (1998, p. 172) in the realm of science studies, 
postmodern skepticism in its radical form challenges the 
view that science gives us objective knowledge about 
reality on a universal scale, and it goes further to cast 
the scientific enterprise as an oppressive force. It takes 
the position that all knowledge is produced by social 
interactions, deeply influenced by social prejudices, and 
therefore valid only in the temporary, localized contexts.
Scientific Method
The development of procedural rules for scientific 
operations is key to the progress of science. Attempts 
to conceptualise and characterise these rules have had a 
very long history. In their work, The Scientific Method, 
Okon & Edeh (2011, p. 45) state that the development of 
methods in science remains instrumental to the growth 
of science itself. Thus many thinkers at different epochs 
have made modest attempts to construct what passes for 
scientific method from different perspectives. From the 
ancient materialists through to Bacon in his rejection 
of the simple enumerative inductive method of science 
and its replacement with the eliminative induction set 
the stage form set the stage for the modern scientific 
outlook championed by the Continental rationalists and 
British empiricists and later thinkers on the methodology 
of science to include: Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, 
Popper and Quine. According to Uduigwomen (2007, 
pp. 24-5) science as a progressive enterprise involves 
the use of the following procedural steps as constituting 
its method: formulation of problem, planning and 
designing of research, collection of data, analysis of 
data and the conclusion. In fact, in order to be termed 
scientific, a method of inquiry must be based on gathering 
observable, empirical and measurable evidence subject 
to specific principles of reasoning. In other words, 
it consists of collecting of data through observation 
and experimentation and the formulation and testing 
of hypothesis. The scientific method is a process for 
experimentation that is used to explore observation and 
answer questions. Scientists use the scientific method 
to search for cause and effect relationships in nature. In 
other words, they design an experiment so that changes 
to one item cause something else to vary in a predictable 
way. From the foregoing, one could summarise the steps 
of the scientific method to include: Ask a question, Do a 
background Research, Construct a hypothesis, Test the 
hypothesis by doing an experiment, Analyse the data and 
draw a conclusion and finally, communicate the results. 
The scientific method is assumed to give humans a neutral 
standpoint outside relatives of culture and history.
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THE PREVALENCE OF SCIENCE IN 
HUMAN LIFE AND SOCIETY
Human life and human society are in every way being 
touched by science that to say we live in the scientific age 
is to state the obvious. A few decades ago; the impact of 
science was not as pervasive as it is in this century. Its 
nature and relevance have continued to evolve in very 
significant ways that seems the future of humankind to 
a large extent dependent on the prudent and responsible 
use of scientific knowledge, discoveries and technological 
products. Van Melson (1997, p. 131) opines “it is the 
task of our generation not merely to develop science and 
technology but also to do this with the correct vision of 
the end pursued. If man is not to be a slave of technology 
and the technological order he created, then the end to 
which this order is oriented must become visible in and 
through order”. Uzoma (1997, p. 142) lends his voice thus 
“the continuity or discontinuity of humanity’s existence on 
this planet earth depends to a large extent on the wise use 
or misuse of the scientific and technological discoveries. 
Modern technology should be seen as a means to an 
end, which is the improvement of the quality of life of 
men”. To achieve the above, Aja (2001, pp. 173-4) asserts 
that man must maintain the distinction between himself 
and the machines of his creation. Linkages of himself 
to machines and technologies that would make him 
irrevocably dependent on the lower order/reality would be 
anti-evolutionary. The modern man must stand above his 
physical technologies if he is to avoid their becoming his 
shell and the principles of their organization anthill.
S C I E N C E  A S  A N  AT T E M P T  T O 
U N D E R S TA N D I N G  R E A L I T Y:  T H E 
JOURNEY SO FAR
The surroundings of man have always attracted the 
concern of man to understand and explain why things 
behave the way they do. Right from the ancient era 
through the contemporary times, man has continuously 
exercised his curious nature to account for the nature of 
things/reality. Roughly, one can say that the ancient period 
of western thought, several people projected general ideas 
in the attempt to account for the basic urstuff of reality. 
Frankfort et al. (1977, p. 12) write: 
“the ancients, like the modern savages, saw man always as part 
of society, and society as imbedded in nature and dependent 
upon cosmic forces. For them nature and man did not stand 
in opposition and did not, therefore, have to be apprehended 
by different modes of cognition. [N]atural phenomena were 
regularly conceived in terms of human experience and... human 
experience was conceived in terms of cosmic events... The 
fundamental difference between the attitudes of modern and 
ancient man as regards the surrounding world is this: for modern 
scientific man the phenomenal world is primarily an ‘It’; for 
ancient - and also for primitive - man it is a ‘Thou.’” 
They add further that 
“primitive thought naturally recognised the relationship of cause 
and effect, but it cannot recognise our view of an impersonal, 
mechanical, and law like functioning of causality. For we have 
moved far from the world of immediate experience in our search 
for true causes, that is causes which will always produce the 
same effect under the same conditions. [T]he primitive mind 
. . . looks, not for the ‘how,’ but for the ‘who,’ when it looks 
for a cause. [T]he gods as personifications of power among 
other things fulfill early man’s need for causes to explain the 
phenomenal world” (Frankfort et al., 1977, pp. 24 & 26).
While most of their contributions and specifications 
were cosmos-centered, their ideas greatly influenced later 
thinkers. In the medieval times, to account for the nature 
of the universe/ reality recourse was made to the divine 
realm. Thus many of their philosophical thoughts were 
theo-centric in nature; even though most classical works 
of Plato and Aristotle were revisited and remoderated 
by great Christian thinkers to suite the emphasis of the 
times. With the coming of the enlightenment; there was 
a shift from revelation and the censorship of Church 
authority and monarchical structures for what passes for 
knowledge to enthrone man with emphasis on the capacity 
of reason to attain valid, certain and reliable knowledge 
was paramount. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
the Aristotelian philosophy came under serious attack. 
First was the presentation and ultimate victory of the 
Copernican (Aristarchean) conception of the solar system, 
which removed the earth from the centre of the universe; 
and second was the Galilean-Newtonian physics, which 
refuted the idea that all motion is caused, and treated the 
earth and the heavens as being the same kind of existents 
obeying the same laws. While the sensible and rational 
faculties in man are key in an attempt for man to come 
to the knowledge of the external world; man became in 
fact the measure of all things, to use Protagoras’ words. It 
is indeed instructive to note here that the stage was well 
prepared for the flourishing of modern science with the 
immense contributions of notable philosophers to include: 
Rene Descartes, Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, Immanuel 
Kant, etc..
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), a father of scientific 
method during the period of religious conservatism, 
brought about by the reformation and counter-reformation, 
unveiled his new science of motion. Neither the contents 
of Galileo’s science, nor the methods of study he selected 
was in keeping with Aristotelian teachings; whereas, 
Aristotle thought that a science should be demonstrated 
from first principles, Galileo had used experiments as a 
research tool. Galileo nevertheless presented his treatise 
in the form of mathematical demonstrations. Within 
the modernist tradition a distinction is typically drawn 
between the “inner world” of mind and the “external 
world” of material. Within this dualist metaphysics, the 
importance placed on the individual mind is sensible 
primarily to the extent that mental processes are 
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advantageous to our actions in the world. In this sense, 
the perfect companion to the fully functioning mind is an 
objectively knowable and rationally decipherable world. 
It is in this respect that the work of Enlightenment figures 
such as Isaac Newton and Francis Bacon were of pivotal 
importance. Their writings convincingly demonstrated that 
if we view the cosmos as material in nature, as composed 
of causally related entities, and available to observation by 
individual minds, then enormous strides can be made in 
our capacities for prediction and control. It is indeed the 
precise determination of the cause-effect relations among 
the elements making up the world that we typically define 
as knowledge. It is important to understand that this, in 
itself, was a bold and innovative step in terms of scientific 
method. The usefulness of mathematics in obtaining 
scientific results was far from obvious (Feldlay, 1999, p. 
133). This is because mathematics did not lend itself to 
the primary pursuit of Aristotelian science: the discovery 
of causes.
The works of  Francis  Bacon established and 
popularized an inductive methodology for scientific 
inquiry, often called the Baconian method, or simply 
put the scientific method. Francis Bacon’s demand for 
a planned procedure of investigating all things natural 
marked a new turn in the rhetorical and theoretical 
framework for science, much of which still surrounds 
conceptions of proper methodology today. Francis 
Bacon introduced the eliminative induction in his Novum 
Organum (1620) as an attempt to describe a rational 
procedure for establishing causation between phenomena 
based on induction. It was radically different from the 
form of induction employed by the Aristotelians. As 
Bacon puts it: “another form of induction must be devised 
than has hitherto been employed, and it must be for 
proving and discovering not first principles (as they are 
called) only, but also the lesser axioms, and the middle, 
and indeed all, for the induction which proceeds by simple 
enumeration is childish” (Jardin & Silverthorne, 1983, 
p. 73). Bacon’s method relied on experimental histories 
to eliminate alternative theories. In this sense, it is a 
precursor to Popper’s falsificationism. However, Bacon 
believed his method would produce certain knowledge 
rather than tentatively justify adherence to knowledge 
claims. Bacon criticized induction by simple enumeration 
as hasty and lacks the rigour of scientific pursuit. In place 
of it, he came up with a formulation which he believes 
will make use of experimental method. For him, the 
process of exclusion is the foundation of true induction. 
SCIENCE AND THE QUESTION OF 
OBJECTIVITY
The first question is that of scientific realism; whether 
science objectively tells us about the world or do we 
construct reality. The view that science is objective 
because it is empirical (based only the data that appeal to 
the senses), rational (reasonable or logically defensible) 
and that its presuppositions are obviously true is under 
intense challenge in the post modern thinking. Osuala 
(1982, p. 12) states that the scientific method constitutes 
the most adequate approach to the discovery of truth, 
and certainly it has demonstrated its worth particularly in 
the physical sciences. For Osuala the method adopted in 
science follows certain dependable steps that guarantee 
objectivity. They include; certain phenomena are 
observed; a problem situation develops and it is noted and 
classified; crude relationships are tentatively identified 
and elaborated; a more or less formal hypothesis is 
derived; a design is developed to test the hypothesis; the 
hypothesis is verified or refuted; the results are subjected 
to further tests and refinements, and finally the results are 
integrated with previous concepts of science. When one 
meticulously observes the aforementioned procedures, 
does it preclude the possibility of error, bias or prejudice? 
Or better put, with the use of measurement as an alleged 
means of reaching objective judgments, judgments having 
at least a high probability of expressing truth regarding 
objective reality. The question that comes to mind is 
whether agreement among subjects; that is, intersubjective 
agreement prove that there is objective truth?
According to Brown (2002, p. 448) there is a 
traditional view of science which allows that social 
factors may play a role in the generation of theories. But it 
holds that such corruptions are filtered out in the process 
of testing. This is the well –known distinction between 
the logic of discovery and the logic of justification. This 
view is now largely untenable. There is simply too much 
contrary evidence produced by sociologists, historians, 
and feminist critics of science to allow us to think that 
science works this way. Science seems to be shot through 
with social factors. There is even an argument raised 
by Okruhlik (1994) that this is inevitable. It is based on 
two assumptions: first, social factors play a role in the 
generation of theories; second, rational theory choice is 
comparative. This second point means that theories are 
chosen on the basis of how they fare compared to one 
another with respect to nature, not by being directly held 
up by nature. Kuhn claims science is a social enterprise 
and as such is also quite subjective. He argues that every 
individual choice between competing theories depends 
on a mixture of objective and subjective factors. The post 
modernists are suspicious of authoritative definitions and 
singular narratives of any trajectory of events (Bishop, 
1996, p. 993). Post modernists attacks on science are 
based on the belief that there is no true objectivity, as 
the authentic implementation of the scientific method 
is impossible. To many scientists, the very idea that 
we construct reality is absurd, and yet even in the 
most analytic of philosophical traditions, the question 
of external or internal realism, as Putman dubbed the 
approaches is a very live issue. Bas Van Frassen in his 
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The Semantic Image, while proposing a semantic account 
of theories based on esotetic (question and answer) logic, 
famously argued in favour of internal realism- what is 
real is what our theories tell us, and there is nothing more. 
So in that case, what we believe to be true is constructed 
by scientists as they build and test theories. This follows 
Quine’s famous paper “On What there is”, in which one’s 
ontology is determined by the quantifiers of a logical 
sentence that expresses your best theory.
According to Fuller (2) the power of science seems 
to rest on three pillars; one is science’s distinctive social 
organization, which enables concentrated periods of both 
team work and criticism, nowadays done on a global scale 
with considerable material resources. Another is concerted 
political effort to apply the results of scientific research to 
all aspects of society; finally is the control that scientists 
continue to exert over how their own history is told. Past 
diversions and failures remain largely hidden, resulting in 
an airbrushed picture of ‘progress’ otherwise absent from 
human affairs.
Advocates of scientific neutrality have argued 
vehemently that scientific knowledge is not coloured by 
cultural biases and evidently free value judgments which is 
even supported by Galileo and documented by Lipscombe 
and Williams (6) that the conclusions of natural science 
are true and necessary, and the judgment of man has 
nothing to do with them. D’Andrade (1995, p. 404) in 
criticizing the post modernist attack on objectivity states 
“science works not because it produces unbiased accounts 
but because its accounts are objective enough to be proved 
or disproved no matter what anyone wants to be true”. The 
idea here is the preponderance of post modern thinking 
that in postmodernity, we find a weakening of reason, 
a breaking down of homogeneous, unifying models of 
knowledge, and “a plurality of non-homogeneous models 
and paradigms of rationality, which cannot be linked, but 
are tied together only by the specificity of their particular 
domain of application”, Montuori (1998, p. 4). In other 
words, knowledge becomes relative and contextual, any 
pretense at linear progressive development is removed, 
and the fascination and faith with the new is replaced by 
a sense of irony and severe doubt in the ability of science, 
technology, and reason to improve the human condition. 
Even as efforts at improving the human condition are 
often rightly viewed with great suspicion, herein lies also 
the danger of “postmodern abandon”.
The point must be made that what underpins the whole 
scientific enterprise is the idea that there is a world out 
there that we are denoting when we speak our theory 
sentences. And that too, post modernism view suggest we 
construct reality for political reasons rather than cognitive 
ones. Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hull and feminists philosophers 
of science all noted that political power games in science 
are not only real things but necessary aspects of science as 
it is practiced. For Wilkins (4) politics is a way to ensure 
that research traditions do not get stuck on suboptimal 
solutions. Referring to the thinking of Thomas Kuhn, 
Brueggmann (1) writes; “scientific knowledge is to some 
extent a political achievement whereby power is criticized 
to shape perception and interpretation in one direction 
rather than in another. To the extent that scientific 
knowledge is a political, rhetorical achievement, it is not 
objective in any positivistic sense. That is, the interest 
of the knower intrudes powerfully into what is known”. 
Or again, it is ideological. In fact, a thinker like David 
Bloor considers subjectivity to be the critical factor and 
does dominate in scientific endeavours (Physics World 
watch, 23). Scientists, however, strive to be completely 
objective and to eliminate subjective bias before, during 
and after their work. Never the less, there is some element 
of subjectivity. Ergeny Feinberg gave the following 
example; after certain number of experiments that agree 
with the predictions, people assume the theory to be 
proved. But how many experiments are needed? This is a 
subjective decision that depends on the nature and quality 
of the experiments and experimenters. Thus, science has a 
subjective element but it is dominantly objective. 
In a similar vein, Luaer (2003, p. 7) remarks that 
“… theory change is not a rational process; it is a 
circumstantially determined, political shift in the 
allegiance of a knowledge community. A change from 
one scientific framework to its successor does not occur 
because scientists have compared all the available 
evidences for the two and rationally selected the better 
one”. In science, a theory is seen not as absolutely true but 
to be provisional and approximate. Science makes a web 
or network of understanding into which known facts can 
fit. This coherence is central to the recognition of truths. 
Science forms a basis for action because of the power of 
prediction. After all, when sociologists are passengers on 
board plane, they – like scientists – expect the laws of 
physics not to change before the plane lands safely. And 
although quantum theory is taken as the basis of truth, 
the problem is that explaining its truths can sometimes 
only be achieved in the language of mathematics. So the 
nearest that one can come to an answer is that science is a 
rationally coherent structure of comprehending the world.
EVALUATING THE IMPORTS OF POST 
MODERN CHALLENGES TO SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE, SOCIETY AND MAN 
Popper as a post modern philosopher in his discourse 
on scientific methodology gives a place to religion, 
culture, metaphysics, communal ideas, prejudices 
and anticipations. Thus, one sees that he gives some 
recognition to the empirically unverifiable realm of thought 
which is in contrast to the positivists according to whom 
all empirically unverifiable statements are meaningless. 
However, it is to be noted that Popper unduly subordinates 
all other realms of human knowledge to the scientific. 
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Popper sees other aspects: religion, metaphysical, cultural 
only as constituting the pre-scientific step that contributes 
to the eventual development of science. On their own, 
they seem to have no valid claim to knowledge. This 
attitude smacks of scientism, an over emphasis on the 
scientific method as the authentic method of acquiring 
knowledge. This to my mind is a reductionistic approach 
to knowledge as every reality can be viewed from diverse 
perspectives, each of which requires its own method. 
Man’s world is multidimensional and so knowledge 
should not be reduced only to the level of the empirical. 
Feyerabend is more forceful in his contention that science 
has no greater authority than any other form of life. Its 
aims are certainly not more important than are the aims 
that guide the lives in a religious community or a tribe that 
is united by a myth (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 299).  In fact, 
Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism denies normative 
status to any methodological principles which agrees 
with Rorty’s rejection of any privileged epistemological 
position for philosophy over other disciplines. This is 
important when one realizes that the goal of scientific 
activity is to construct knowledge considered to be 
reliable according to science’s own criteria of reason 
and experience, as embodied in methodologies such as 
naturalism, uniformity, induction, repeatability, efficient 
causation, falsifiability, and multiple working hypotheses.
Dilworth (2006, pp. 203-6) observes that the 
development of the physicalist line in the form of modern 
science has, on both the empirical and theoretical levels, 
been more fruitful than the development of any other 
epistemology. The practical successes of modern science 
are also generally thought to be great, those that perhaps 
first come to mind being in the realm of medicine. Here 
however one must ask what should constitute an overall 
improvement in the situation of humankind, and then 
consider whether modern science has actually led to such 
an improvement. As regards medicine, for example, it 
has been claimed that thanks to the influence of modern 
science the average life-expectancy of a large portion of 
the world’s human population is greater now than it was 
in the past. On the other hand, however, we are today 
witnessing mass starvation in Africa which can in part 
be linked to the decrease in infant mortality due to the 
employment of modern medical techniques. 
Given the pace at which science has so advanced 
and affected several aspects of human life positively, 
the tendency is to see everything in the light of the 
scientific point of view. Thus, science seems to have been 
enthroned and decorated with the crown of knowledge 
per excellence; the most rational of all human enterprise; 
the authentic way of arriving at truth and as well, it has 
been robed with the garment of objective truth. Science 
has been institutionalized in the society and it has become 
the watch dog for every human activity in contemporary 
times.  
In this regard, Feyerabend (1978, p. 295) cautions 
strongly that we should not increase our professional 
qualifications at the expense of our humanity. And to this 
extent science can become ideological and all ideologies 
should be seen from perspective. He therefore calls for the 
liberation of all methodological constraints because they 
distort the talents of man and that every knowledge claim 
is context dependent. 
If the above is not done, then it is capable of 
resurrecting the polemics between two cultures that 
prompted a famous conference led by Charles P Snow, 
called at Cambridge in 1959 and published in the volume: 
Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. The terms of 
the polemics were well synthesized by Franscesco Barone 
as follows: “the central theme of the polemics regards the 
weight and importance to give in a modern education, to 
literary-humanistic formation or to scientific-technical 
education. On the one hand, the humanists’ insist on the 
superiority of literary formation as the only formation 
capable of arousing the sense of values, of giving a 
meaning to life, of bringing to light ends and the ultimate 
goals which permit us to orient ourselves and to orient the 
use of the instruments at our disposition, including those 
of science and technique. On the other hand, the scientists’ 
accentuate the superiority of scientific and technical 
formation, calling on its capacity to construct a serious 
and mature though, able to resolve the problems that have 
for centuries tormented the concrete life of humanity 
and that become always more numerous in the present 
era. Artistic and literary production has for them, at the 
most, only a value of diversion and evasion that, even it is 
appreciable in itself, ends up distracting person from real 
questions”.
Given the complex nature of  real i ty and the 
cumbersome nature of expensive researches; the need 
for interdependence and collaboration of methods 
informed by various disciplines cannot be underestimated. 
The resulting imperative is informed by the fact of 
interconnectedness of reality or all that there is. In fact, 
the post empiricist philosophy of science as championed 
by Thomas Kuhn, Mary Hesie and others have suggested 
the acceptance of other forms of knowledge into our 
theories of knowledge, truth and ontology. Rorty (1980, 
p. 102) for example, argued that the privileged position 
accorded science in contemporary culture is uncalled for. 
Rorty’s position is in consonance with the post modernist 
philosophers like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida 
who have debunked the meta-narrative privileges accorded 
to scientific narrative. Such should not be misread to mean 
non relevance of scientific conceptual schemes but a need 
for a synthesis. 
If it is true that every ideology should be seen 
from perspective, it follows that there is no particular 
philosophy, theory, ideology (science inclusive), fact, 
opinion, belief that is sufficient in itself. Thus, no 
knowledge can exhaust completely all that is needed to be 
said or known about truth or reality. Therefore, scientific 
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paradigms are not superior to any other paradigms of 
human endeavours; all fields of intellectual study are 
important so long as they value and maintain standards of 
honest and critical inquiry. Holding of arms as partners 
in the common search for solutions that will benefit 
humankind is here advocated. This is the only disposition 
that can guarantee the gradual shift and moving beyond 
reductive and disjunctive thought which can assist 
us in bypassing post modern anxiety and lead us to a 
participative rather than a bystander world where we are 
aware of creating context but not foundations, trust but 
not truth.
CONCLUSION
The attempt in this paper has been to estimate the claims 
and counter claims of those who perceive science as 
having access to objective reality in a way and manner 
so unique and has been responsible for the immense 
transformation of the society for the good of man on the 
one hand and the post modernist scholars who contest the 
superiority complex of science in terms of objectivity. 
Politics, social status, wealth, religious values and other 
factors are sometimes involved in scientific debates and 
controversies but that does not mean that those factors 
ultimately decide the merit or acceptance of scientific 
theories. Explanatory power, agreement with other data 
and existing theories, falsifiable predictions and empirical 
tests eventually dominate as self correcting forces in 
scientific inquiry. In as much as these influences are 
evident and undeniable in the scientific endeavours and 
enterprises, the need to exercise caution and honesty, 
cooperation and partnership is key and critical in a 
much more complex world where man is indeed on a 
threshold courtesy of  several challenges modern science 
and technology pose. The aforementioned, is in tandem 
with Tauber’s view that avoiding the dogmatism that 
had defined both extremes in the recent science wars and 
presenting a conception of reason that lifts the discussion 
out of the interminable debates about objectivity and 
neutrality. He does this by projecting an understanding of 
science as an evolving relationship between facts and the 
values that govern their discovery and application. Within 
this context, truth and objectivity function as working 
ideals and serve as pragmatic tools (Tauber, 2009). 
This call by post modern thinking ought not be seen as 
a device to bring about the destruction of truth and the 
enthronement of relativism but an encouragement for the 
scientists to be more modest in their pronouncements so 
that the public is not oversold on what science can do.
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